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Abstract
The United States Air Force, for many years, has successfully deployed Airmen all over the world to execute operations. To do so, during all major conflicts, the Air Force has set up temporary Forward Operating Locations (FOL) to support their mission. Due to the shift in the nature of the war from initial conventional to insurgency, not since the Vietnam War has forward-deployed Air Force basing been enveloped within a violent insurgency environment. This paper addresses the major planning and capability shortfalls experienced during the development of the Air Force FOL network within Iraq beginning in June 2003. It will also review logistics challenges created by failures to upgrade outdated support systems and the deficiencies in training and equipping our Airmen for working and living in a combat environment. Finally, solutions are identified to resolve issues experienced during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and to help transform today's Air Force into a more rapidly deployable and capable force to counter tomorrow's adversary. 
Introduction/Background
The United States Air Force, for many years, has successfully deployed Airmen all over the world to execute operations. To do so, during all major conflicts, the Air Force has set up temporary Forward Operating Locations (FOL) to support their mission. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), a network of "bare" bases was planned to support ground forces and projects associated with the redevelopment of Iraq, following the fall of Saddam's Regime. Due to the shift in the nature of the war from initial conventional to insurgency, not since the Vietnam War has forward-deployed Air Force basing been enveloped within a violent insurgency environment.
Civilian and military planners for OIF believed Iraqis would welcome the Allies, and they did initially in the predominantly Shiite and Kurdish regions in the south and northeast, respectively. Even in Baghdad, which is within a region known as the "Sunni Triangle,"
Iraqis welcomed the fall of Saddam. In fact, senior Air Force personnel based at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP or Camp Sather) were free to travel into Baghdad to eat at local restaurants with minimal security precautions.
1 Unfortunately, the security environment rapidly evolved as more military personnel began to occupy regions around Baghdad
International Airport. The U.S. military build-up at BIAP quickly drew the attention of the growing insurgency. Rocket, mortar, small arms, and shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles soon became a daily threat to the U.S. and coalition forces around BIAP.
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The security threat to Air Force personnel, as a result of the growing insurgency in Iraq, created an unfamiliar environment for the Air Force, not experienced since Vietnam.
Many of the Air Force FOLs in Iraq became exposed to regular attacks, logistics lines were threatened by the enemy, and any travel outside the base fell victim to enemy disruption. In Hardening structures and shelter/bunker materials were not properly planned for in the "bare" base buildup plan. Several of the airbases in dangerous regions of Iraq had only limited numbers of HESCOs available to harden some of the tent areas. 
Equipment Shortfalls
The individual mobility equipment requirements a person deploys to the field with is determined by the Operational Planners, usually at the major command (MAJCOM) level.
Air Force planners determine requirements based on the deployment location and the best available equipment in the Air Force inventory. At the start of OIF, the Air Force had obsolete and outdated equipment available for Airmen deploying into combat environments.
Weapons and body armor, specifically, were inferior to that provided their Army and Marine had not yet been issued the gear. 14 Airmen also received M-16A2s, with some arriving into theater with Vietnam era M16A1s. 15 Individual mobility equipment, like weapons and body armor, were basically old and outdated.
Up-Armored Humvees and 10,000-pound capacity Adverse Terrain Loaders (10K A/T) were two special-purpose vehicles in short supply during OIF. Shortages were predominantly due to insufficient allocations for deployment and competing demand due to ongoing operations for OEF. Camp Sather, at BIAP, received only two armored Humvees to support a "bare" base of over 1100 Air Force personnel. Up-Armored Humvees were also notorious for maintenance problems, so usually only one was operational at any given time.
Other leased vehicles were available as a substitute, but they were unarmored Toyota Land
Cruisers or GMC pickup trucks, which lacked protection from small arms, RPG, or Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The 10K A/T was the most utilitarian of all base equipment throughout the Area of Responsibility (AOR), because of their payload, unimproved surface capability, and usefulness throughout airbase operations. There was no capable substitute for the 10K A/T, and on many occasions day-to-day missions and base sustainment operations were directly impacted by the shortage in the AOR.
The Air Force failure to upgrade the quality of individual mobility items over the years can probably be attributed to their assumption the Air Force would not be directly involved in a war where the quality of these items would be a determining factor in how effective we fought. Armored vehicles would not be a significant requirement for operations, with the exception of EOD and Security Forces. Air Force planners never expected operations so heavily based within enemy territory and for Airmen to be regularly engaging enemy forces.
Logistics Problems
The Air Force experienced a serious deficiency in a capable mobile fuel distribution system. None of the four Air Force "bare" bases opened in Iraq during OIF had usable fuel storage or underground pumping systems, common at most airports in developed countries.
Lack of storage and pumping capability demanded the deployment of outdated fuels mobility support equipment (FMSE) to supply fuel. 16 The FMSE first entered service in the 1960s originally to support tactical field forces when the need arose to deploy a fuel support system; they later became the Air Force answer to a mobile deployable system for forward deployed fuel operations. 17 They are not only very old systems but have been plagued by a number of operational problems. In general, the FMSE performed poorly in OIF. 18 The fuel trucks and mechanical pumps were regularly victims of maintenance problems. Their age and the hot dusty weather of southwest Asia combined to make the systems in need of practically continuous maintenance. The Air Force has very few liquid fuels mechanics with the training and experience to troubleshoot the equipment. During the start of OIF, many
FOLs did not have a single experienced mechanic assigned. Bases that had the expertise were lucky to have one mechanic, which required them to work long hours to maintain the high tempo operations during OIF. Bases without experienced mechanics were forced to improvise using talented vehicle mechanics with the proper maintenance technical orders.
The other major problem with deployable fuel systems was leaking bladders. Again, the extreme heat in southwest Asia contributed to the problem. All the bladders leaked, some worse than others. They can be, and are, patched repeatedly, as leaks become too numerous or severe, the bladders eventually need to be replaced prematurely and discarded. Replacing Airmen must be trained to combat proficiency with either the M16 or M9, with an increased number trained on heavier weapons as needed.
Another important skill for all Airmen deploying to the AOR is first-aid training. In the Air Force, the training is called Self-Aid and Buddy Care. Not enough emphasis is placed on this core competency. Like weapons training, it is administered every few years and not to an adequate level of understanding. Airmen should be able to respond to the needs of a wounded comrade. They should be able to skillfully provide basic medical assistance in the field and improve the survivability of their fellow soldiers.
For Air Force personnel, the lack of advance planning and training for convoy operations, was the worst example of how the Air Force was unprepared. During the initial convoys, vehicle mechanics acted as security, while vehicle drivers drove the supply trucks.
It was a very dangerous situation that could have led to more casualties than resulted. 21 Practically every convoy experienced an improvised explosive device (IED), rocket propelled grenades, small arms fire, or mortar attack. 22 Air Force personnel needed the ability to protect themselves and their convoy and were woefully unprepared to do both.
Recommendations
The Air Force must plan and train for the type of combat environment Airmen will face whether conventional or unconventional. OEF, and to a greater extent OIF, have created a view into the future of how the Air Force must be able to deploy and fight. Since the start of OEF in 2001, the Air Force has reacted to the changing combat environment through various programs. The first such program is EAGLE FLAG, which began its first exercise in October 2003. EAGLE FLAG is an Air Force-level Expeditionary Combat Support Exercise designed to train Airmen in the latest procedures and equipment available to establish an air base and achieve initial operation capability for any type of forward operation. 23 The concept is a step in the right direction; however, it must be administered to all senior and mid-level leaders prior to deployment with recurring training every couple of years. All Air
Force personnel should ultimately receive the training prior to deploying, if timing permits.
Special base opening teams should be created that provide the right skilled personnel
and equipment to open a "bare" base in enemy territory with limited infrastructure. A category three FOL site is the worst case location and would be considered a "bare" base possessing only a useable runway, water source and fuel, or the potential to set up a deployable fuel system. 24 The team should be broken down into elements that are timed to The overall standard base operating footprint needs to become smaller at "bare" base airfields. This would help reduce the time it takes to set up a fully operational airbase in a "bare" base environment. The five-day goal is probably unreasonable, but the timelines experienced during OEF and OIF were much too long. The HARVEST FALCON "bare" basing kits, which are self-contained deployment structures, are not designed for rapid deployment function and require too much airlift to get them to the FOL. It takes 72 C-17 loads or 250 trucks to deliver a standard HARVEST FALCON expeditionary shelter package, which takes four days to assemble. A set this size is capable of housing 1100 people and includes electrical generator support. 26 A new version of HARVEST FALCON needs to be developed that is more modular. Smaller elements could be forward deployed to set up the basic base elements that would allow operational sorties to begin, and then expanded as time progresses to expand base capabilities.
Improvements need to be developed into the HESCO barrier systems to make them lighter in weight. The HESCO concept is very simple and quick to install and can provide great security to a large area in a very short period of time. The current designs are too heavy making them impractical for airlift and requiring too many trucks to deliver them to the FOL. closer to regional areas of conflict would be a quick solution to today's problem of securing FOL "bare" bases fast.
Providing the proper equipment to Airmen prior to deployments is a problem that merely needs funding and advance planning prior to the start of hostilities. Funding was provided in FY04 and FY05 for $140 million to equip four AEFs with the latest quality body armor. Up-armored Humvees were also purchased with funding during FY04 and FY05 at a cost of $29.6 million providing 173 new vehicles. 27 The weapons used in the field by Air
Force personnel also need to be upgraded. A good starting point would be modernizing the weapons carried by the Security Forces, then pass on their used equipment to the rest of the Air Force personnel. The Security Forces are the first line of defense for deployed airbases and they should have the most capable weapons available. Individual weapons for the rest of the deployed population are a secondary defense, but should also be improved over current older model M16s. Smaller M4s should also be available to individuals manning convoy operations. They would provide greater ease of operation from a convoy vehicle.
A new replacement to the 10K A/T should also be sourced. A more versatile model would allow for a forklift attachment as well as a bucket loading capability. The forklift capability fills a very common need throughout all airfields in the AOR. There are often competing groups that fight for the use of 10Ks. The bucket attachment would make it also useful for filling HESCOs and preparing surfaces at "bare" bases during airbase construction.
The adverse terrain four wheel drive high clearance feature is also a must when operating on a "bare" base. Using Iraq as an example, there are very few areas with prepared surfaces outside of towns and at the "bare" base locations. In the time that it takes for a new 10K A/T to be developed, more of the existing model should be provided to the field.
The solution to the poor deployable fuels system appears to have been resolved with the introduction of the Fuels Operational Readiness Capability Equipment (FORCE). The new system is modular in design reducing the logistics footprint and manpower while increasing throughput and effectiveness at bases. The Air Force has programmed $87.1 million to purchase the systems through FY11. 28 The existing forty-plus-year old equipment should be replaced as soon as the new systems are available. First article testing was scheduled for the spring of 2005 with production models available in FY06. 29 Convoy operations appear to be here to stay, and will very possibly be a requirement in future conflicts in remote under-developed countries. Formal joint training started late in CY04 with the Army at the Army's Transportation Center at Fort Eustis and Fort Jackson.
The equipment, procedures and tactics have all improved and continue to change as we adapt to changing enemy tactics. The equipment currently in use is the best available in the form of armored vehicles, firepower and personal body armor protection. As seen by the following OIF (2003 OIF ( -2004 . Many of the situational observations are his firsthand account of the problems. Lynch, 44. 6 Ibid, [46] [47] Rainey and Scott (2004) , 165. 8 Lynch, 51-55. 9 Ibid, [14] [15] 54 . 10 Rainey and Scott (2004), 166. 
